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Applying Popper’s Probability
by Alan B. Whiting
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Professor Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influ-
ential philosophers of science of the twentieth century, best known for
his doctrine of falsifiability. His axiomatic formulation of probability,
however, is unknown to current scientists, though it is championed
by several current philosophers of science as superior to the familiar
version. Applying his system to problems identified by himself and his
supporters, it is shown that it does not have some features he intended
and does not solve the problems they have identified.
1 Probability and the philosophers
Professor Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994) is known to scientists as the author
of the ‘doctrine of falsifiability,’ in which a statement is only admitted to
be scientific if it can, in principle, be falsified. Although not strictly the
originator of the idea, he can be credited with emphasizing it and it is a
useful test for pseudoscientific statements. His clearest statement of this is
from the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery:
. . . we adopt, as our criterion of demarcation, the criterion of
falsifiability, i. e. of an (at least) unilateral or asymmetrical
or one-sided decidability. According to this criterion, statements,
or systems of statements, convey information about the empirical
world only if they are capable of clashing with experience; or more
precisely, only if they can be systematically tested, that is to say,
if they can be subjected (in accordance with a ‘methodological
decision’) to tests which might result in their refutation. 1 §*i,
pp. 313-4, p. 315. [Here I use his italics, as I will henceforth.]
1The work is available in at least two editions, either of which may be conveniently
available but which differ slightly in pagination. In what follows I will cite the section;
then the page numbers in [1]; then those in [2].
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There is a great deal of other material in this, his most famous work,
however; a previous investigation [3] has shown that it demonstrates Popper’s
understanding of science and especially mathematics to be often inadequate
or erroneous. Here I will examine one part of the work that has been singled
out as useful.
A significant part of The Logic of Scientific Discovery is given over to
an axiomatic formulation of probability. It is unknown among practicing
scientists, but a number of philosophers cite it with approval, considering it
superior to the familiar version.
Fitelson, Haje´k and Hall [4] consider Popper’s formulation ‘the most gen-
eral and elegant’ of proposed axiomatizations of two-place probability (that
is, formulations in which conditional probability is taken as elementary, and
absolute or one-place probability is a derived form). McGee [5] agrees that
‘Popper’s axioms constitute a true generalization of ordinary probability the-
ory.’ Roeper and Leblanc [6] note that autonomous formulations of probabil-
ity, that is those constructed independent of semantic constraints, ‘pioneered
by Popper, are preferred by us.’ (p. 5). A clue as to what the generalization
consists of is given by the same authors when they state
It is advantageous to turn Carnap’s partial functions into total
ones, this by stipulating that P(A,B)=1 when B is logically false,
an option discussed by Carnap in (1950) and widely adopted in
studies of the subject. (p. 11)2
That is, Roeper and Leblanc desire a formulation of probability in which
any statement (A) is true (probability unity), if a false statement (zero prob-
ability, B) is given as a condition.
Perhaps the clearest statement championing Popper, however, is given
by Alan Haje´k [7]. His overall thesis is that conditional probability is basic
and absolute probability a derived notion, something Popper provides. He
also identifies some problems with the conventional formulation that Pop-
per’s version is claimed to solve. These are centered on situations with zero
probability.
2Notation among the references is almost uniform, but not quite. Letters, upper or
lower case, are events or hypotheses, things that might be true or not. P(A,B), with
the letter ‘P’ upper or lower case, is the probability of event A given that B is true.
The probability of a combination of events, that is the probability of both A and B
happening given C, is P(AB,C). Converting to the form more usual for scientists, p(a | b),
is straightforward. In my own expositions I will follow that used by Popper, p(a, b), to
make comparison easier.
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Using the normal formulation, the probability of two things A and B both
occurring is
p(AB) = p(A,B)p(B) (1)
which is quickly rearranged to form the conditional probability, that of A
given B:
p(A,B) =
p(AB)
p(B)
(2)
Haje´k finds this inadequate in two types of problems. First, the sphere:
A point is chosen at random from the surface of the earth (thought
of as a perfect sphere); what is the probability that it lies in
the Western hemisphere given that it lies on the equator? 1/2,
surely. Yet the probability of the condition is 0, since a uniform
probability measure over a sphere must award probabilities to
regions in proportion to their area, and the equator has area
0. The ratio analysis thus cannot deliver the intuitively correct
answer. (pp. 111-112)
Next, there is the situation of all possible sequences of infinite tosses of a
coin.
Any particular sequence has probability zero (assuming that the
trials are independent and identically distributed with interme-
diate probability for heads). Yet surely various corresponding
conditional probabilities are defined—e. g. , the probability that
a fair coin lands heads on every toss, given that it lands heads on
tosses 3, 4, 5, . . . , is 1/4. (p. 112)
(In other places Haje´k makes more extensive attacks on conventional
probability, but this is where they are most clearly connected with Popper.)
Here Haje´k seeks a system that gives a defined probability conditional upon
an event with zero probability, something he finds in Popper.
So Popper’s formulation of probability is currently considered a viable
and even superior version among at least a group of philosophers.
2 Popper’s motivation
It is instructive to gain a flavor of Popper’s reasoning by examining his mo-
tivation for developing a new formulation of probability.
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In §80 of the Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper is concerned with con-
structing the probability of a hypothesis from a series of events, or rather
with refuting Richenbach’s attempt to do so. He notes that, if one makes a
ratio of events confirming the hypothesis to total events, one finds a ‘prob-
ability’ of 1/2 for a hypothesis that is refuted by half the events (p. 257, p.
255). After trying several variations on this theme, he concludes, ‘This seems
to me to exhaust the possibilities of basing the concept of the probability of
a hypothesis on that of the frequency of true statements (or the frequency of
false ones), and thereby on the frequency theory of the probability of events
(p. 260, p. 258).’
In the Postscript, §*vii, Popper modifies this conclusion, stating
We may to this end interpret the universal statement a as entail-
ing an infinite product of singular statements, each endowed with
a probability which of course must be less than unity. (p. 364, p.
376)
Popper does not explicitly connect these ‘singular statements’ to the more
familiar language of a theory and its predictions. However, from this and
other sections it seems clear that he is asserting that the probability of a
theory is the product of the probabilities of all its predictions. He realises
that this implies that all the ‘singular statements’ must be independent, if
considered as probabilities of events, but justifies his formulation with the
opaque assertion that any other situation is ‘non-logical’ (pp. 367-8, p. 379).
Popper’s conclusion, in an infinite universe, is that all theories are of zero
probability (p. 364, p. 376)3.
A separate route leading to the same conclusion starts from a development
in Jeffreys’ Theory of Probability ([9], pp. 38-9). Jeffreys starts with the
hypothesis q, previous information H (which is not, as Popper notes, vital to
the argument) and some experimental fact p1. Writing P (qp1, H) two ways
and rearranging,
P (q, p1H) =
P (q,H)P (p1, qH)
P (p1, H)
(3)
3It has been pointed out to the author that an infinite product of factors all less than
one is not necessarily zero. If an = (1− 1/n
2), for instance, and one begins at n = 2, the
product converges to 1/2. This is less important in the present context than the fact that
Popper’s whole approach is erroneous.
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Now if p1 is a consequence of q, P (p1, qH) = 1 so
P (q, p1H) =
P (q,H)
P (p1, H)
. (4)
If p2, p3, . . . , pn are further consequences of q which are each in turn found to
be true,
P (q, p1p2 . . .H) =
P (q,H)
P (p1, H)P (p2, p1H) · · ·P (pn, p1p2 · · · pn−1H)
(5)
in which we are dividing P (q,H) by a growing product of probabilities. Jef-
freys notes three possibilities for P (q, p1p2 . . .H): (1) it can grow without
limit, as it will if the (unbounded in number) series of P (p
n
, · · ·) has a sig-
nificant population less than unity; (2) P (q,H) may be identically zero, in
which case P (q, p1p2 . . .H) will also be identically zero; or (3) the P (pn, · · ·)
become arbitrarily close to unity. The first option is ruled out by the defi-
nition of probability. Jeffreys choses option (3), interpreting it as a growing
confidence in the predictions of a theory based on a growing number of suc-
cessful predictions.
In §*vii (pp. 370-1, pp. 383-4), Popper asserts that (3) leads to a paradox.
He adduces two hypotheses (call them q1 and q2), each of which predict
p1, p2, . . . , pn−1. But while q1 predicts pn, q2 predicts its contradiction, p¯n.
Then Jeffrys’ formulae predict both p
n
and p¯
n
with near-unity probability.
Hence the only choice is (2), all theories have zero probability.
Of course there is no paradox in P (p
n
, p1 · · ·Hq1) ≃ 1 at the same time
as P (p¯
n
, p1 · · ·Hq2) ≃ 1; the probabilities have different conditions. (It is
interesting that, in a section devoted to the probability of hypotheses, Popper
ignores them.) In fact this is the classical decisive experiment, which actually
happens much more rarely than the tidy-minded would like.
There are things about Jeffrys’ calculation to make one uneasy. It is
rather circular, for instance, to stipulate that the p
n
all actually happen (so
that P (p
n
, · · ·) = 1), then conclude that their probabilites are high. But one
cannot use it to conclude that the probabilities of all theories vanish.
In these three sections, then, we have examples of Popper using the con-
ventional theory of probability to calculate the probability of a theory, based
on its predictions and events, and getting it wrong. It is worth noting that he
has seen it done properly in at least one instance, and accepts it as correct.
In §*ix (pp. 407-8, p. 425) he asserts that the probability of a coin landing
5
heads is 1/2, given that it has landed heads in 500,000 ± 1,350 tosses out of
a million previously. The tacit hypothesis ‘this is a fair coin’ has been given
a high probability based on the probability of its predicted events, and not
by forming a product of a million factors of 1/2.
As a consequence of Popper’s reasoning, he asserts, ‘. . . there is a need
for a probability calculus in which we may operate with second arguments of
zero absolute probability’ (§*vi, p. 330, p. 335). Note that his motivation,
based on errors in applying the conventional system of probability, is not
the same as that of Haje´k’s problems [7] or the ‘total functions’ of Fitelson,
Haje´k and Hall [4], though they lead to the same requirement.
We will add one further problem Popper identifies with conventional prob-
abily as applied to the confirmation of hypotheses. It is not directly related
to the zero-probability matter, but forms another aspect of Popper’s attack
and we may apply his system to it. In §*ix (pp. 390-1, pp. 406-7) he presents
the situation of a standard six-sided die. Hypothesis x is that it rolls a six,
and x¯ that it rolls some other number. Given a fair die (tacitly assumed by
Popper) and no other information, P (x) = 1/6, P (x¯) = 5/6. Then given the
information z that the die roll was even, we have P (x, z) = 1/3, P (x¯, z)=2/3.
The added information has increased the probability of x and decreased that
of x¯, but still P (x, z) < P (x¯, z). Popper finds this ‘clearly self-contradictory’
if probability is to be used to judge the corroboration of a theory. Popper is
requiring that any evidence that supports a theory makes it more likely than
its contradiction. Let us call this the requirement for absolute support.
3 Developing Popper’s formulation
It would be very useful to have a demonstration of exactly how Popper’s
system of probability is used in a given instance, and especially one showing
its advantages over the conventional one. Unfortunately, in the references at
hand the authors do not set out any details about how Popper’s formulation
solves the problems they identify. Nor does Popper show, in any specific
problem, where his formulation solves or even addresses the flaws he identi-
fies with conventional probability. We must work that out from the axioms
themselves, an approach that also permits us to see what the formulation says
and does not say. After some development, we will then apply the system to
the several problems.
Popper sets out his axioms in slightly different ways in several places in
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[1],[2], but the development here (as well as the exposition in [7]) generally
follows §*iv, pp. 332ff, pp. 336ff; §*v, pp. 349-353, pp. 356-361. Although
everything in the formulation can be immediately interpreted in terms of
conditional probability, we will refrain from any such interpretation until
after a number of results have been obtained formally.
We begin with S, a collection (one would say set, but Popper is mistaken
on important parts of set theory [3] so we avoid the term) of otherwise un-
defined objects a, b, . . . . There is a unary operation of complementation,
with a¯ also being in S, and two binary operations: conjunction, with ab also
a member of S, and p(a, b) being a real number.
The axioms, with a, b, c, d, . . . representing any member of S, are:
A1. There are elements a, b, c and d in S such that p(a, b) 6= p(c, d).
A2. If p(a, c) = p(b, c) for every c in S, then p(d, a) = p(d, b) for every d in
S.
A3. p(a, a) = p(b, b)
B1. p(ab, c) ≤ p(a, c)
B2. p(ab, c) = p(a, bc)p(b, c)
Ci. p(a, b) + p(a¯, b) = p(b, b), if there is some c such that p(c, b) 6= p(b, b).
Cii. p(a¯, b) = p(a, a) if there is no such c.
Note in particular the exclusive nature of Ci and Cii.
First, we set bounds on p(a, a), invoking A3, B1 and B2:
p(a, a) = p(b, b) = k
p((aa)a, a) ≤ p(aa, a)
p(aa, a) ≤ p(a, a) = k
p((aa)a, a) = p(aa, aa)p(a, a) = k2
k2 ≤ k
0 ≤ k ≤ 1
Next, some bounds on the general p(a, b) and a useful result on arguments
in both positions. Invoking B1 and B2:
p(ab, ab) ≤ p(a, ab)
k ≤ p(a, ab)
p(aa, b) = p(a, ab)p(a, b)
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p(a, b) ≥ p(a, ab)p(a, b)
1 ≥ p(a, ab), p(a, b) 6= 0
Now using B1 and B2 again,
p(ab, c) = p(a, bc)p(b, c)
p(b, c) ≥ p(a, bc)p(b, c)
1 ≥ p(a, bc), p(b, c) 6= 0
Popper derives k = 1 using Ci. To save time and because we want
to avoid depending on a particular branch of C, we shall simply assume
p(a, a) = 1, which of course must be true if we are to interpret these axioms
as a formulation of probability. With the above development, that means
p(a, ab) = 1 (6)
It is convenient to have a version of eq. 6 with the conditional reversed
(note we have not yet shown that p(·, ab) = p(·, ba)). Starting with B2,
p(ab, c) = p(a, bc)p(b, c) (7)
but since p(a, bc) is bounded by unity,
p(ab, c) ≤ p(b, c) (8)
and so
p(ab, ab) ≤ p(b, ab) (9)
and, with k = 1,
p(b, ab) = 1. (10)
Now using Ci (and employing b as a general member of S to avoid po-
tential confusion in what follows),
p(b, b) + p(b¯, b) = p(b, b)
p(b¯, b) = 0
Note that in using Ci we have made an assumption about the behaviour of
b; the following shows it isn’t necessarily true.
We again write Ci,
p(a, aa¯) + p(a¯, aa¯) = p(aa¯, aa¯) (11)
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which, in light of equations 6 and 10, gives 2 = 1; so Ci cannot hold and we
are forced into Cii:
p(b, aa¯) = 1 (12)
for any b in S.
Note that the elements of S have been divided into two classes by Popper:
those for which Ci is true and p(a¯, a) = 0, and those for which Cii is true
and p(b¯, b) = 1. All elements of S of the form aa¯ are in the latter class.
At this point we may impose the obvious interpretation of Popper’s sys-
tem as a formulation of probability. The elements of S are events, things
that happen or not; they may be composite, ab meaning that both a and b
happen; and p(a, b) is the probability that a occurs, given that b does. A Ci
event and its complement exhaust all possibilities, and either b or b¯ is true.
Cii events, however, do unconventional things, which we shall examine in a
moment.
4 Applying Popper
As a warm-up, we will apply Popper’s system to his requirement of absolute
support. That is the requirement that any event or information making an
hypothesis more probable than before must make it more probable than its
contradiction. In our notation, we require
p(a, bc) > p(a, c)⇒ p(a, bc) > p(a¯, bc) (13)
(note that the inequalities preclude bc or c being Cii events). This means
p(a, c) ≥ p(a¯, bc) (14)
since if p(a, c) < p(a¯, bc) there are possible values for p(a, bc) that would allow
p(a, c) < p(a, bc) < p(a¯, bc) (15)
and absolute support is not satisfied. Applying B2 to Eq. 14 and rearranging,
p(b, c)p(a, c) ≥ p(a¯b, c) (16)
Next we write a version of Ci:
p(b, c) + p(b¯, c) = 1 (17)
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and multiply the left-hand term by unity, again using Ci:
[p(a, bc) + p(a¯, bc)] p(b, c) + p(b¯, c) = 1 (18)
and applying B2,
p(ab, c) + p(a¯b, c) + p(b¯, c) = 1 (19)
which rearranges (again using Ci) to give
p(a¯b, c) = −p(ab, c) + p(b, c) (20)
which we insert in Eq. 16, obtaining
p(b, c)p(a, c) ≥ −p(ab, c) + p(b, c) (21)
which rearranges to give
p(b, c)− p(b, c)p(a, c) ≤ p(ab, c) (22)
and, invoking B1,
p(b, c)− p(b, c)p(a, c) ≤ p(a, c) (23)
which rearranges to give
p(b, c) ≤
p(a, c)
1− p(a, c)
. (24)
For p(a, c) ≥ 1/2, that is an original event at least as probable as its
contradiction, this is no restriction on the supporting information b at all;
which is what one would expect. If p(a, c) is small, however, condition 24
is very limiting. For very improbable original events p(b, c) ≃ p(a, c), which
(recalling that b must support a) essentially makes b identical with a. Popper
has not succeeded in implementing his requirement of absolute support.
To be fair, there is no indication that he developed his formulation of
probability with this requirement in mind; he does not refer to it in his
exposition of the system. We may say, however, that any success he may
have in remedying what he sees as the flaws in conventional probability is
less than total.
We now turn to the situations of zero-probability conditionals. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot yet apply Popper’s system to either Haje´k’s problems or
scientific hypotheses. It requires, as a conditional, aa¯; that is, a statement
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and its complement together, which not only have probability zero of oc-
curing simultaneously, but exhaust all possibilities between them. ‘A point
is chosen at random on the surface of a sphere’ and ‘the point lands on the
equator,’ while having probability zero of happening together, do not exhaust
all possibilities. ‘The point lands on the equator’ and ‘the point does not land
on the equator’ would satisfy the requirement, but that’s not the problem
Haje´k sets. Similarly, ‘an hypothesis is true’ together with ‘the hypothesis
is false’ would satisfy the condition, but again that’s not what Popper was
aiming for.
(One might conceivably postulate that all zero-probability statements
in Popper’s system take the form of a¯a. It’s not clear that it could be
done consistently, and in any case makes any interpretation as a system of
probability problematic.)
What Popper was clearly aiming for, and what Haje´k’s problems and
‘total functions’ require, is a definite value for p(a, bc) whenever p(b, c) = 0,
and not only when b = c¯. Popper desires a value of unity; he asserts in §23, p.
91, p. 71, ‘From a self-contradictory statement, any statement whatsoever
can be validly deduced.’ (In the accompanying footnote he comments on
others’ treatment of the idea.) It is very similar to Roeper and Leblanc’s
‘total functions’ region (above), and thus is ‘widely adopted.’ Fitelson and
Hawthorne [8] agree that ‘everything follows from any inconsistent set of
statements.’ The difference between contradictory statements and merely
inconsistent ones may seem trivial, but is important in applying Popper’s
mathematics.
As Fitelson, Haje´k and Hall [4] noted, Carnap ([10] pp. 295-6) consid-
ered the more general prospect. For statements conditional on logically false
(L-false) evidence, he notes that if they are not explicitly excluded, systems
such as Jeffreys’ contain contradictions (though he allows that Jeffreys may
have tacitly excluded such statements). The value P = 1 ‘seems most natu-
ral,’ though some of Carnap’s theorems must retain the exclusion of L-false
conditionals even if this is chosen. If one assumes P = 0 there are also
problems, though different ones4. Carnap seems inclined to simply exclude
L-false conditionals.
Given the clear intention of Popper and his supporters, let us enumerate
4Everyone among the authories consulted has made the tacit assumption that the
probabilities of all statements conditional on zero-probability events are identical. This is
remarkable. It does not hold for conditionals of any other value. But further discussion
would take us too far from the matter at hand.
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the possibilities. The desired statement is
D. For any c in S, and any a and b in S such that p(a, b) = 0, p(c, ab) = 1.
Three things could happen:
(1) It could be that D is inconsistent with Popper’s formulation.
(2) It could be that D is derivable in Popper’s system, and that the deriva-
tion simply doesn’t appear in the references at hand or has not yet been
accomplished.
(3) It could be that D is consistent with Popper’s formulation, but must be
added as a separate axiom.
If (1) holds, Popper has accomplished the precise opposite of his intention
and what his supporters understand him to have done. It is also unclear why
it shouldn’t hold for a¯a conditionals. We shall disregard this possibility.
If (2) or (3) holds the effect is the same. Rather than spend what might be
a lot of time and effort attempting to determine which is true, we will proceed
to add D as an additional axiom, realizing that it might be unnecessary.
Applying it now to Haje´k’s sphere, c =‘the point lands in the Western
Hemisphere,’, a =‘the point lands on the Equator’ and b =‘a point is chosen
at random on a sphere.’ We find that the probability of the point landing in
the Western Hemisphere is 1, which does not accord with Haje´k’s intuition.
But we also find, with probability 1, c =‘the point lands in the Eastern
Hemisphere,’ c =‘the point lands on the Arctic Circle,’ c =‘the point does
not land on the Equator.’ All statements are true; Haje´k’s intuitive answers
are there among them, but so are their direct contradictions. A similar
situation holds with his restricted series of coin flips.
(It might be possible to restrict the allowed c to those Haje´k desires, but
to do so contradicts Popper’s system as formulated, and so is beyond the
scope of this paper.)
Next we apply D to a scientific theory, of (as Popper asserts) zero prob-
ability, which was the original motivation for Popper’s formulation. We find
that everything is true, given any theory. All theories predict every event.
Thus, in an enormous irony, Popper the exponent of falsification has pro-
duced a system in which no theory can ever be falsified.
Of course Popper’s derivations that the probabilities of all theories vanish
are erroneous. That sends us back to the very beginning, with nothing in
particular accomplished.
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5 Conclusions
Popper’s formulation of probability, motivated by his own errors in applying
the conventional theory, does not accomplish what he intended and what
his present supporters claim. Like a great deal of The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, it has nothing to do with the logic of scientific discovery.
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